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Our firm undertook representation of a local interstate trucking company, Dark Horse Express, LLC (“Dark Horse”) in a cargo insurance claim case in which Lancer Insurance Company (“Lancer”) issued the cargo insurance coverage which was at issue. At the district court level, Lancer argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because Dark Horse’s customer, which owned the lost cargo, had never obtained a judgment against Dark Horse for the cargo loss at issue. Lancer won a summary judgment from the District Court. We appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which reversed the District Court.

Here is a summary of the basic facts:

  • Dark Horse was hauling about $250,000 worth of steaks for its customer, PFG, from Dallas to Lebanon
  • Dark Horse’s driver stopped just outside of Dallas after picking up the load
  • While stopped, someone broke the seal of the truck and stole about $35,000 worth of the steaks
  • PFG refused to take the remainder of the steaks because of the broken seal and possible contamination
  • Under the contract between Dark Horse and PFG, which was titled “Transportation Agreement,” Dark Horse had agreed to be liable for the full value of the load in the event the seal of the truck was broken
  • Dark Horse paid PFG for the value of the load, less the salvage that was obtained by PFG
  • Dark Horse then made a claim under its cargo insurance coverage with Lancer for the amount it paid its customer, PFG, for the loss of the load
  • Lancer refused to pay for various reasons, including that no court judgment had been entered against Dark Horse in favor of PFG for the loss of the load
  • Dark Horse filed suit in Sumner County, Tennessee Circuit Court and Lancer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
  • Lancer moved for summary judgment on several grounds

One of Lancer’s summary judgment arguments was that the insurance policy at issue contained a provision which, Lancer asserted, conditioned Lancer’s duty to pay on a judgment being entered against Dark Horse by a court. The specific provision upon which Lancer relied required Lancer to pay sums Dark Horse “legally must pay as a motor carrier for ‘loss’ to Cargo ….”

The District Court held that the language in question did require a judgment to be entered by a court of competent jurisdiction against Dark Horse and in favor of PFG before Lancer had any obligation to pay the claim. It based its decision, in substantial part, on a 1971 decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, but noted that there was contrary authority decided under at least one other state’s contract law.

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Anecdotally, the defense of novation to a breach of contract claim under Tennessee law seems to do about as well as the multitude of other defenses which are often pled, but much less frequently successful. In a nutshell, a novation occurs when a prior contract between the same parties is replaced and extinguished by a new contract. The defense is often used by defendants who claim that, because of a novation, they were let off the hook and are no longer responsible for the obligations to which they agreed.

In a recent breach of contract case before the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Premier Imaging/Medical Systems, Inc. v. Coffey Family Medical Clinic, P.C., that court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the defendant had failed to prove the defense of novation.  Here are the key facts:

  • The defendant, CFMC, was a medical practice
  • CFMC entered into a contract (the “Contract”) with Premier whereby Premier was to service a medical scanner used by CFMC
  • The Contract had a five-year term and required CFMC to pay about $4,500 per month
  • The effective date of the Contract was January 1, 2011
  • In 2013, the principal of CFMC, Dr. Coffey, entered into a separate contract with a company called Pioneer (the “Pioneer Contract”)
  • Under the Pioneer Contract, Pioneer assumed contractual obligations of CFMC including CFMC’s contractual obligations to Premier under the Contract
  • Premier was not a party to the Pioneer Contract and did not agree that CFMC was no longer obligated pursuant to the Contract
  • CFMC requested that Premier begin sending its monthly invoices to Pioneer
  • Premier, thereafter, did send the monthly invoices to Pioneer
  • Pioneer made monthly payments to Premier for only four months after which its relationship with Dr. Coffey and CFMC deteriorated

Since the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and reasoning of the trial court, the appellate court’s reasoning will be discussed here. The court started its analysis by laying out the four elements that have to be proven for a novation: (1) a prior valid obligation; (2) an agreement supported by evidence of intention; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) a valid new contract. It also noted a couple of other key points about the defense of novation. First, the party asserting it has the burden of proving it. Second, while a novation may be implied and does not have to be established by evidence that it was expressed, it is never presumed and must be established by a clear and definite intention.

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In a case brought by two home owners against their home owners association (“HOA”), against the HOA directors, and against a bank that stacked the HOA board with directors which were its employees, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee recently issued an important and insightful opinion in the case of Urbanavage et. al. v. Capital Bank, et. al. Home owners frequently face an uphill battle when trying to assert their rights or when pursued by an HOA.  This opinion gives home owners some ammunition. It also reiterates how difficult it can be for a home owner to prevail on claims against directors of an HOA.

A crucial dichotomy in the case was that the Home Owner Plaintiffs brought claims not only against the HOA and its directors, but also, against a Bank which had stepped into the shoes of the Developer when the Developer went belly up.

Here are the key facts:

  • Developer developed a residential subdivision called Carothers Crossing
  • Developer defaulted on its loans with the Bank which financed the project
  • As the result of an agreement between the Bank and Developer, Bank was assigned all of Developer’s rights under the Master Deed Restrictions and Declaration (‘Master Deed”)
  • As with most master deeds and declarations governing residential developments, the one in this case gave the Developer the right to appoint all members of the board of directors of the HOA until a very substantial portion of the planned units had been constructed and sold
  • The Master Deed, as most, if not all, do, required the HOA to maintain the common areas (sometimes called “common elements”) and to enforce the provisions in the Master Deed
  • The Bank requested that the Directors relieve it of its obligations under the Master Deed (although the opinion does not specify what those obligations were, the trial court record establishes that the Bank, having stepped into the shoes of the Developer, was obligated to expend funds for common area maintenance)
  • The Directors refused the Bank’s request
  • The Bank then replaced all of the Directors of the HOA Board with persons who were its employees
  • The Plaintiff Home Owners alleged that, once installed as the new Directors, the Bank employees prevented the HOA from fulfilling its obligations to maintain the common areas
  • Before they filed suit, the Plaintiff Home Owners stopped paying their HOA dues

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It is pretty typical for commercial leases in Tennessee, and in other states, to allow a tenant (otherwise known as a “lessee”) to assign its rights and obligations under a commercial lease. It is also pretty typical that such provisions provide that the landlord (otherwise known as the “lessor”) cannot “unreasonably” withhold consent to such an assignment.

An instructive case on what Tennessee courts would consider to be unreasonably withholding consent to an assignment of a lease by a landlord is 1963 Jackson, Inc. v. De Vos (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). Here are the basic facts:

  • In 1967, a commercial lease (“Lease”) was entered into between the parties’ predecessors
  • The commercial lease was a “ground lease” pursuant to which the Lessee was obligated to construct and maintain a hotel
  • In 2005, the Lessor became a trust benefitting descendants of the original owner
  • A Mr. De Vos was the trustee of that trust and acted as the Lessor
  • By 2009, through a series of events, the Lessee became a company named “1963 Jackson”
  • 1963 Jackson requested that De Vos allow it to assign the Lease to a company called the “Morgan Group”
  • 1963 Jackson notified De Vos of its intent to assign the Lease to the Morgan Group and requested that he let it know what he needed in order to consider approving such an assignment
  • De Vos requested financial information of the shareholders of the Morgan Group
  • The two shareholders had net worth’s of $27 million dollars and $800,000, respectively, as established by financial statements provided to De Vos
  • One of the shareholders had $1.3 million in liquid net assets
  • That information was not enough for De Vos and he requested that the two shareholders of the Morgan Group agree to guarantee, personally, the obligations of the Lessee under the Lease
  • He also asked for information about the shareholders’ experience in hotel management
  • The shareholders agreed to provide personal guarantees for the Lease and supplied De Vos with an extensive outline of their experience in the hotel industry
  • De Vos refused to consent to the assignment (and, in fact, terminated the Lease based on what he considered to be breaches)

The trial court determined that De Vos had unreasonably withheld his consent to the assignment and found in favor of the tenant, 1963 Jackson. That decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

The court started its analysis by observing that, under Tennessee commercial lease law, the “primary factor” in determining whether a landlord has unreasonably withheld consent to an assignment is the “financial responsibility” of the proposed assignee.

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Just because someone expressly revokes a prior will when they make a new will does not mean that the revoked will can never be effective again. Given, it is rare that a revoked will is revived in Tennessee probate litigation, but it has happened.

In a recently decided probate lawsuit, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee upheld a trial court’s revival of a will which had been expressly revoked. Here are the basic facts:

  • Dad had three adult children (two daughters and a son)
  • Dad had a companion with whom he had lived with in his house for about 30 years named Rebecca Dudley
  • In 2005, Dad executed a will which left real and personal property equally to his three children and in which he granted Ms. Dudley a life estate in his house, vehicle, garage and yard
  • In the 2005 will, Dad’s residuary estate was left solely to his son
  • In 2011, Dad executed a new will
  • The 2011 will expressly revoked all prior wills
  • The 2011 will was just like his 2005 will, except it divided his residuary estate equally among his children
  • Dad died at age 77 at which time he was of sound mind
  • The original of the 2011 will could not be found
  • The original of the 2005 will was found in Dad’s personal file cabinet

After Dad’s death, his children took the position that he had died intestate. If he had died intestate, Ms. Dudley would not be entitled to a life estate in any of Dad’s property. Ms. Dudley took the position that the 2005 will had been revived after it was revoked.  Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed with Ms. Dudley’s position. The appellate court’s opinion is discussed in this blog.

The court pointed out that, under long-standing Tennessee probate law, a revoked will can be revived. In order for a revoked will to be revived, the proponent of the will must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator intended to revive the revoked will.

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Sometimes in a breach of contract case, or other commercial litigation matter, a party will be met with the defense that it is not entitled to recover because a condition precedent to the parties’ contract was not fulfilled. Under Tennessee law, a party is not required to perform under a contract unless and until a condition precedent agreed upon by both parties has been satisfied.  However, and very importantly, to rely successfully on the defense that a condition precedent was not satisfied, a party must first prove that there was a condition precedent.

Because conditions precedent have a tendency to result in harsh and unfair outcomes, Tennessee courts disfavor finding the existence of conditions precedent. Sometimes, even when they do find a condition precedent which was indisputably not satisfied, nevertheless, they do not allow that fact to permit a party to avoid performance.

A leading case on conditions precedent in Tennessee was decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1996. In that case, Koch v. Construction Technology, Inc., a subcontractor filed a breach of contract case alleging that the general contractor had failed to pay it for the entire amount due for work done on a project owned by the Memphis Housing Authority (“MHA”).  In defense, the general contractor claimed that it was not required to pay the entire balance it owed to the subcontractor because a condition precedent to its performance had not been fulfilled.

The written contract between the contractor and subcontractor in the Koch case contained a provision referred to as a “pay when paid” clause.  It stated: “Partial payments subject to all applicable provisions of the Contract shall be made when and as payments are received by the Contractor.”  The general contractor argued that the only amount for which it had not paid the subcontractor was the amount MHA had not paid it.  It also argued that the above language created a condition precedent.

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There are two categories of Tennessee partition cases. A partition in kind occurs when a court divides property owned by joint tenants between or among them. A partition by sale occurs when the court orders the sale of the property so that the proceeds can be divided between or among the joint owners.

In Tennessee, the law has long been that a partition in kind is preferred and that a partition by sale will only be granted under two conditions: (1) Where the property cannot be divided (for example, a property, some parts of which would not have public access if divided, or a property that cannot be divided into smaller tracts because of a restrictive covenant); or (2) where the property would bring more money sold as a whole than the joints owners’ shares would bring if sold individually.

In reality, very many jointly owned properties cannot be partitioned in kind, especially properties in more developed and regulated areas as opposed those in rural areas. Even if all of the property cannot be partitioned in kind, under Tennessee partition law, a court can make a partial partition in kind.  In other words, it can exclude some property from a partition by sale and vest it in one or more joint owners.

In Breen v. Sharp (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), two nephews and their aunt owned, as tenants in common, three non-contiguous tracts of undeveloped rural land. Aunt owned fifty percent (50%) and her nephews owned twenty-five percent (25%) each.  The nephews wanted to partition all of the land by sale.  Aunt wanted a partition in kind because, on the western side of one of the tracts (“Tract 2”), was the location of land that had sentimental value as it had been the location of a schoolhouse where her family members had taught and attended.

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Whether or not a will has or has not been revoked can sometimes be the subject of probate litigation in Tennessee courts. The answer to that question may also determine who receives a substantial amount of money or other property.

There is a Tennessee statute, T.C.A. §32-1-201, which sets forth several methods by which a will, or part of a will, can be revoked. Under that statute, a will, or any part of the will, may be revoked by:

(1)         A subsequent will.  Usually, wills expressly state that they revoke all previous wills. The statute also provides that, even if the will does not expressly revoke a prior will, it does so if it is inconsistent with the prior will.

(2)         A document of revocation which is executed in the same manner as an attested will or a holographic will which expressly revokes the prior will or a part of it.

(3)         If the will is “burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed” with the intent to revoke.  This method is effective if done by the testator, or by someone acting for the testator and in his or her presence when the act is performed.

(4)         A marriage of the testator occurring after the will was made and the birth of a child of the testator after the will was made.

The provision allowing a will, or part thereof, to be revoked by being “cancelled” was interpreted by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in the case of In re Estate of Warren (Tenn. Ct. App 1999).  This is an important case with which any Tennessee probate litigation attorney should be familiar.  Here are the facts: Continue reading →

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In a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in the case of Stokely v. Stokely, it upheld the trial court’s decision in a Tennessee partition case in which the trial court had dismissed the claims of the joint owners who sought to partition the land in question.  The case is notable for a couple of points.

First, it is authority that establishes that, in Tennessee, real estate cannot be partitioned when one joint owner has a life estate (at least as long as that joint owner is alive). This is an exception to the general rule that any joint owner is entitled to a partition whenever that owner so desires one. Second, it reiterates the rule that, when you sign legal documents, you cannot avoid the consequences by claiming that you did not fully understand what you signed.

Here are the basic facts of the case:

  • Mother owned a house and land (“Property”) in which she lived with one of her children, Anna
  • Including Anna, there were seven siblings (“Siblings”)
  • Mother died without a will in 2003
  • Because Mother died without a will, all of her children, Siblings, inherited an equal interest in the Property
  • After Mother’s death, Siblings signed a Quitclaim Deed granting Anna a life estate in the Property
  • Some of the Siblings signed the Quitclaim Deed themselves, but the signature of four of them was effectuated by the use of a Power of Attorney they gave to a brother, who was one of the Siblings
  • The Power of Attorney expressly referenced that it was given so that the brother could sign a Quitclaim Deed reserving a life estate to Anna

Disagreements arose between the Siblings. In 2015, four of the Siblings filed a partition case in order to have the Property partitioned.  The trial court dismissed the partition case on two separate grounds. First, it found that a partition could not occur due to the life estate held by Anna. Second, it held that the cause of action to reform the Quitclaim Deed to rescind the life estate given to Anna, which was asserted by the Siblings who had filed the case, was barred by the statute of limitations.

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At the outset of a will contest case or undue influence case, clients often ask what to expect in terms of how the case will progress, what will need to be done before trial, and how long it will take to resolve the case.

For starters, let’s talk about the chances that a will contest or undue influence case will make it as far as a trial. The overwhelming majority of civil actions which are filed in Tennessee courts are settled or are resolved by a dispositive motion before a trial becomes necessary. In my experience, undue influence and will contest cases are generally more difficult to have dismissed before trial than many other types of Tennessee cases.  As well, they are often not as amenable to settlement, in my experience. So, the chances that a will contest or undue influence case will actually go to trial is somewhat greater than the chances that other types of cases will go to trial. Still, in my experience, most do settle short of a trial.

You are most likely to obtain an expedient settlement and a larger settlement if you retain a lawyer with experience handling will contest and undue influence cases and who opposing counsel knows will prepare your case for trial and try it unless a fair settlement is reached.

Our firm defends and prosecutes Tennessee will contest cases and undue influence cases. For purposes of this blog, I will give a perspective of how such cases progress when we are representing the will contestant or the party challenging a transaction on the basis of undue influence or fraud.

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